This paper presents a plausible reasoning sys tem to illustrate some broad issues in knowl edge representation : dualities between dif ferent reasoning forms, the difficulty of uni fying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature of plausible reason ing. These issues have a common underly ing theme: there should be an u nderlying belief calculus of which the many different reasoning forms are special cases, sometimes approximate. The system presented allows reasoning about defaults, likelihood, neces sity and possibility in a manner similar to the earlier work of Adams. The system is based on the belief calculus of subjective Bayesian probability which itself is based on a few simple assumptions about how belief should be manipulated. Approximations, semantics, consistency and consequence results are pre sented for the system. While this puts these often discussed plausible reasoning forms on a probabilistic footing, useful application to practical problems remains an issue.
INTRODUCTION
There are many styles of knowledge representation and inference involving some form of uncertainty or incon sistency: reasoning about likelihoods, independence and related notions such as causality, confirmation, defaults and statistical frequencies, and tasks such as analogy, abduction and belief revision. In knowledge representation there is now a recognised need for the unification and development of these multiple, comple mentary forms of reasoning (Brachman, 1990) . To do this unification an underlying belief calculus is needed as a common base for the different reasoning forms. First, this paper presents a system unifying defaults, *Research Institute for Advanced C01nputer Science.
likelihood, necessity and possibility. Because the sys tem uses Bayesian probability as the underlying belief calculus, independence, abduction, belief revision and many other facets of plausible reasoning could be inte grated as well, although it is not done so here. Second this paper argues that plausible reasoning can be inter preted as a form of approximate reasoning. This has important implications to the implementation of plau sible reasoning systems. For instance, error can accu mulate in a long chain of plausible reasoning, so po tential error should be tracked. So this paper also dis cusses approximate methods for tracking error. Also, we cannot expect plausible reasoning to be correct ev ery time. Many of the so-called paradoxes in plausible reasoning arise because it is assumed that plausible reasoning will always lead to a correct conclusion.
The system presented here, like most Bayesian meth ods, is based on a few basic assumptions together with a few approximations. The assumptions are about how belief can be modelled and updated and have been pre sented in (Horvitz et a!., 1986) . The same Bayesian principles have led to the development of algorithms for learning (Buntine, 1991a) , uncertain inference, and many more applications outside of artificial intelli gence. Bayesian methods arc claimed to be normative, which means they set a standard for plausible rc<cson ing and implies they will not suffer from the standard paradoxes that arc discussed in the non-monotonic lit erature (Hanks and McDermott, 1987; Poole, 1989; Pearl, 1988; Etherington ct a!., 1990) . (Treatment of several paradoxes are given here and in (Buntinc, 1001 b) .) The system presented here only implcmcn ts one facet of the Bayesian approach and therefore is in complete and may require extending with one of many complementary modes of normative reasoning, such as the making of default assumptions about indepen dence (Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1900b) .
The next section informally introduces the notation for a qualitative and a quantitative logic that each demon strate a different level of approximation for reasoning about defaults and likelihoods. The default compo nent of the qualitative logic corresponds to the various conditional logics developed for default reason ing (Delgrande, 1988; Pearl, 1988; Geffner, 1988) but most closely to Adams' improper conditional (Adams, 1966) . The quantitative logic has its roots in remarks made by Adams. The qualitative system is presented here only for contrast with the quantitative system, because the quantitative system has many advantages with little extra overhead. The third section cov ers the theory of the two systems, semantics, con sistency and consequence. Since the qualitative logic is an extension of Adams conditional logic (Adams, 1%6; Adams, 1975) , applied to default reasoning by Geffner and Pearl (Pearl, 1988; Geffner, 1988) , this greatly extends and simplifies Adams' and Goldszmidt and Pearl's (Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1990a) consistency and consequence tests by incorporating necessity, pos sibility, and likelihood in a quantitative framework. The quantitative framework allows approximate de fault and likelihood reasoning and tracking of accumu lated error at the same time. The fourth section illus trates the use of the logics on some standard problems from the literature. The fifth section uses the logics to illustrate some major properties of plausible reasoning.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to cover the basic notions of probability and decision theory underlying subsequent sections. Suitable introductions from an AI perspective can be found in (Langlotz and Short liffc, 1989; Horvitz et a!. , 1988; Pearl, 1988) .
NOTATION
DP is a propositionaJl logic annotated with proba bility bounds, and has a probabilistic rather than a possible world semantics. This allows inequality rea soning as an approxilnation to nonnative reasoning about point probabilities. QDP drops the numeric subscripts from DP and is designed to be a qualita tive counterpart of DP. It is intended to be an ap proximation to DP for reasoning about "small" but not infinitesimal probabilities. The semantics of QDP complements DP and is based on order of magnitude reasoning, but also has an infinitesimal semantics sim ilar to Adams' conditional logic.
DP is built on the language Dp that is constructed from the propositional language together with four modal operators: the unary connectives D (necessity), o (possibility), and the binary connectives =? (de fault with error bound) and � (likelihood with lower bound). There is no nesting of these operators. The operators can be interpreted as follows. (Delow A and D both represent arbitrary propositions.)
1 Although propositional sentences are dealt with throughout, pseudo-first-order sentences will sometimes be used. They arc effectively propositional if there are known to be a finite number of constants, no quantifiers arc al lowed, and a sentence with variables is intended to repre sent a. sentence scltcma. Given that you know just A about the current situation, D is at least likely (with belief no less than e) .
These four operators are joined using the standard boolean connectives ( � (negation), -+ (conditional), II (conjunction), etc.) to form the language Dp. This language also has a qualitative version, QDp, which has the numeric subscripts dropped. The semantics for the language implements this by making € and e infinitesimal; not because we believe them to be in finitesimal but as a mathematical abstraction to ob tain approximate behaviour of the operators for £ and e small. Q D p has successively weaker forms of the likelihood operator. A� D denotes "likely, " whereas A �2 D would denote "barely likely, " etc. This is related to the iterated likelihood operator found in (Halpern and Rabin, 1987) and has a formal justifi cation in Theorem 3 part 2.
A �" D: Given that you know just A about the current situation, D is at least likely to be ... to be likely (to order n) .
The default and likelihood operators are "improper" according to Adams' terminology (Adams, 1966 whereas Aust7· al i an �2 Dri nks -another-Foster ' s expresses the fact that, at least occasionly, an Australian will drink even more Foster's. Surprisingly enough, they also able to express sentences more in the spirit of autoepistemic (Moore, 1985) and default logics (Reiter, 1980) . We can in terpret the sentence "a professor has a Ph.D. unless known otherwise" two ways:
Read as "if it is possible that a particnlar profes sor has a PhD, then the professor most l-ikely has a Ph.D.," and "if it is possible that a particular pro fessor has a PhD, then the professor definitely has a Ph.D." respectively. The default logic representation, from P.rof(x) II M Phd(x) infer Phd(x), corresponds to the second reading. So the possibility operator, " o ", behaves rather like the /'.1 operator of default logic.
THEORY
This section presents the semantics for the two logics and then discusses their intended use in plausible rea soning. Basic consistency and consequence theorems are given.
SEMANTICS
In DP, "I=Pr D" denotes that DE Dp is true for the probability distribution Pr. Pr plays a role not unlike an interpretation in standard propositional logic.
Definition 1 Given a probability distribution Pr on propositions, "I= Pr " is defined on sentences from D p as follows. Consistency and consequence for sentences are defined in the usual manner based on the notion of a theorem.
To obtain qualitative rules about default and likeli hood from the quantitative rules in DP, we can per form order of magnitude reasoning. We can consider a representative default error, €1 where € might be less than 0.01, or whatever the decision context requires. Likewise, we can consider a representative default like lihood, e, where e might be greater than 0.05, say. In order to approximate the behaviour of our reasoning with these particular limits in mind, we can parame terise the system by € and e and consider only approx imate calculations to 0(€) and O(e). QDp is defined in a manner such that € and e are arbitrarily small, but € is also arbitrarily smaller than e.
Definition 3 A sentenceD E QDp is a theorem of the qualitative probabilistic logic QP D if there exists a theorem D' E Dp corresponding to D (that is, iden tical except for any super or s· ubscripts), in which all s· ubscripts to "=;." and " :::: :>-" aTe parameterised by some variables € and e and each subscript to "=;." is of order € as € approaches 0 and e remains finite, and each sub script in D' corresponding to ":::: :>-n" in D is of order e" as e and� approach 0. Th-is is denoted "I= QD P D".
Again, consistency and consequence are defined in the usual manner.
This definition can be reinterpreted to give an infinites imal semantics close to that of Adams. Lemma 1 below (Buntine, 1991b) does this using a standard clausal form for defaults and another for likelihoods that col lects all necessities and possibilities into the left-hand side of the clause. For the D p sentences in the lemma, 6 is an error prop agation factor, and 0€ and OE"'' are the error propaga tion functions respectively. For the default clause, the larger the value of 6, the faster error can propagate when the clause is applied in some chain of reason ing. Since a smaller likelihood represents more room for error, in the likelihood clause the smaller the value of 6, the faster error will propagate when the clause is applied in some chain of reasoning.
For instance, the sentence (A:::: :>-, C) 1\ (B :::: :
is a theorem of DP with the error propagation function f given by ed f < :::; min(e, d ).
Therefore we can drop the subscripts to get a Q D P theorem as well.
THEOREMS
DP and QDP give a system for reasoning qualita tively and quantitatively about probability inequal ities. However, normative reasoning according to Bayesian principles is based on point probabilities. Of ten in normative reasoning, we have a specific deci sion context in mind and we wish to determine if the probability of some proposition is less than or greater than some fixed probability (determined by the loss function). DP and QDP are then approximations for dealing with this special case. QDP is merely an ab straction of DP given here to show the connection of DP with existing conditional and probabilistically mo tivated logics. Because of the inability of QDP to keep track of error, it would be a potentially unsafe system to use in practice.
If the problem contains a good deal of uncertainty so the errors are large, or the loss function for the deci sions to be made requires careful evaluation of com parative probabilities, it may be more appropriate to conduct a careful probabilistic analysis instead of us ing the approximate methods suggested here. If how ever, the errors are small, it is shown in this section we can do consistency and consequence tests in D P us ing qualitative reasoning about defaults and likelihood, and follow this with some simple error propagation cal culations to calculate upper bounds on propagated er rors. These approximate probability calculations may then be a sufficient basis for making decisions. Details of this approach arc described in this section. This makes DP a safe alternative to QDP when approxi mate reasoning seems appropriate.
Notice though that whether a sentence from Dp is con sistent or is a consequence of some other can be con verted to a set of simplex problems in the variables, as done with Probabilistic Logic (Nilsson, 1986) . We shall not pursue this approach, however, since we are concerned with approximate modelling of default and likelihood reasoning, for which "propagation errors" can be calculated rapidly using other more approxi mate means, as shown below.
Algorithms for consistency and consequence are given here for the numerically annotated logic DP. To ob tain results for QDP, simply drop the subscripts, and in the case of likelihoods, be careful to check the or ders of magnitude of the error propagation functions. Since each of the theorems below allows arbitrary pos sibilities to be included, the algorithms can be readily converted to the proper versions of the operators.
The algorithms rely on first computing the subset of the default (likelihood) operators that must have their antecedents necessarily false. For instance, in (A =?B) A (A=? �B) A (C =? D), A must be neces sarily false since both B and �n cannot be "typical" at the same time. So both the first two defaults must have their antecedents necessarily false. These com puted subsets for defaults (likelihoods) are referred to as the maximum (minimum) inconsistent set. An al gorithm for computing the maximum inconsistent set of a DP sentence with defaults is given in Figure 1 . The algorithm for computing the minimum inconsis tent set for a DP sentence containing no defaults is given in Figure 2 . Logical tests for consistency and consequence arc given in Theorem 2 for Dp clauses containing no likelihood operator. The role of the max imum inconsistent set can best be seen by looking at A Dp sentence DU 1\iElv oV; 1\;EfA A;=:-,.
Bi, where €i < d.4r, �fori E IA.
Output:
The maxinnun inconsistent set, lmax·
Algorithm:
Let I = IA. If there exists a j E I such that U 1\ Aj 1\iEI (A; -> B;) is satisfiable, then remove that j from I. Repeat this until no j found or I= 0. Ima• is then given by I.
Figure 1: The defaults-inconsistency algorithm
Input:
A Dp sentence DU 1\iElv oV; 1\iEIA A; *'• B;, where e; < � fori E IA.
Output:
The minimum inconsistent set, I min.
Algorithm:
Let I = 0. If there exists a j E IA-I such that U 1\;ei �A; 1\ Aj 1\ Bj is unsatisfiable, then add that j to I and repeat until no j found. lmin is now given by I. Notice by part 1, if the DP sentence contains proper default operators (so possibilities are included), then the sentence will necessarily be inconsistent if the max imum inconsistent set is non-empty. The correspond ing property applies to likelihoods.
Tests for consistency and consequence using the like lihood operator arc given in Theorem 3. Methods for computing tighter bounds for the error propagation function, linear in some cases, arc given in (Buntinc, 1991b) . c.
Input:
A consistent Dp sentence DU 1\;ervoV;/\;erA A; *'e i B;, where Ci < rf4T for i E IA, its miniinun1 inconsistent set I min, and a likelihood c�1D.
Output:
Whether the likelihood is a consequence of the sentence for some value of f.
Algorithm:
If U 1\;El.,;. �A; 1\ C 1\ �n is unsatisfi able, return is a consequence for any f. Set I= 0. This property can be used, for instance, to convert a QDP formula containing a mixture of defaults and likelihoods into a stronger formula containing just de faults, and so prove consistency of the weaker formula.
EXAMPLES
The logics are illustrated here on some standard para doxes from the knowledge representation literature.
Others handled are the "Yale shooting problem" and "Can Joe read and write?" (Buntine, 1991b) .
THE LOTTERY PARADOX
Suppose a lottery has 1, 000,000 participants. The following two sentences are theorems of DP. The first follows from Theorem 2, and the second is its dual constructed by converting defaults to likelihoods and rearranging:
1,000,000
1\ (t1·ue =>, (person i wont win lottery)) --+ i:::: : l (t1·ue =?1 , ooo,ooo., (no-one will win lottery)) , with its dual, (true �' (someone will win lottery)) --+ 1,000,000
V (t1·ue �--' -(person i will win lottery)) .
1,000,000 i:::: : l
Moreover, replacing 1, 000, 000 by 999, 999 yields sen tences that are not theorems of Q D P. Ignoring the error bounds as done in QDP, the first sentence would seem to read "if, by default, any particular person will not win the lottery, then, by default, no-one will win the lottery at all". Likewise, the second DP sentence would seem to read: "if it is likely that someone will win the lottery, then for some lottery entrant, it is likely they will win the lottery" (clearly not the case before the draw).
The two readings arc versions of the lottery paradox that arc the dual of each other. In the first DP sen tence the natural value for £ is 1 00� 000; this leaves the sentence impotent because the ' err � r bound in the conclusion becomes 1. In DP there is no paradoxi cal reading. QDP unfortunately drops the subscripts (both are of order £ as £ approaches 0) and loses the error information. QDP suffers from the lottery para dox because it disregards the approximate nature of the default and likelihood operators. In the first sen tence above, taking the conjunction of one million dif ferent approximate statements leads to an incorrect statement because the error in each accumulates.
Because of the cheap cost of maintaining approximate error calculations, as demonstrated in Theorem 3 for DP, there would seem little reason for using a purely qualitative system such as QDP.
THE "VANISHING" EMUS
The modelling of default reasoning based on infinites imal probabilities has been criticised on the grounds that it makes "subclasses vanish" (Neufeld ct al., 1990, pl23) . Etherington, Kraus and Perlis (Etherington et al., 1990) show a related problem applies to defanlt logic and circumscription.
Consider the following rules:
Bird(x) => Flies(x) . We can conclude (using Theorem 2) that "typically, birds aren't emus", Bird(x) => -.Emu(x), and "typi cally, things aren't emus", true=> -.Emu(x).
If we take the infinitesimal semantics of the default op erator literally then we could conclude that "no birds are emus", or "nothing is an emu". The real intent of the probabilistic semantics presented here, however, is about approximations so a more correct reading of the conclusion is that the emu is an uncommon or non typical bird, which in reality is true of emus.
Circumscription, when presented with this same prob lem will deduce there are no emus to minimise the exceptions (Etherington et a!., 1990 ). Etherington, Kraus and Perlis invent the notion of scope to over come the same kind of difficulties in default logics and circumscription (Etherington et a!., 1990) :
We contend that the intention of default rea soning is generally not to determine the prop erties of every individual in the domain, but rather those of some particular individuals of interest.
QDP resolves the same paradoxes using a related prin ciple that falls out naturally from the Bayesian frame work and can be stated as follows:
The intention of default rea.soning is gener ally to determine rea. sonable properties of an individual in the domain. While these may be reasonable individually, they are not nec essarily correct so one cannot rea. sonably say they apply uniformly.
CONCLUSION
The systems presented here do not do full norma tive Bayesian reasoning but instead are approxima tions valid in certain situations (as explained at the beginning of Section 3.2). Approximations have two effects: they can make a system incomplete or incor rect. DP has retained correctness but become incom plete. In QDP correctness is also lost by doing order of magnitude reasoning. One result of incompleteness is that on many general problems these systems will need complementary rea. soning forms in order to pro duce a result. A result of incorrectness is that errors in reasoning can creep in, especially when they are hid den in qualitative reasoning which has a logical form making it appear deceptively accurate. As shown with the examples, both these results are a source of ma terial for paradoxes if the underlying approximations arc not understood.
Some Properties of Plausible Reasoning
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This section discusses the issues raised by this: unify ing complementary reasoning forms, the nature of ap proximate reasoning, and the dualities between default and likelihood reasoning. These insights, together with Theorems 2 and 3 form the major contributions of this paper. This gives us a much deeper insight into the problems of knowledge representation and inference in volving some form of uncertainty.
DUALITIES
One of the first things taught to students of logic is the duality between disjunction and conjunction (-.(AI\ B) <--> (-.Av-.B) and ·(AV B)<--> (-.Af\-.B)).
In modal logic, duality also holds between necessity and possibility (DA <--> -, o -.A and oA <--> -.0-,A).
In DP the corresponding duality applies between de fault and likelihood. This means, for instance, that we can obtain dual forms for all DP theorems and to a limited degree some QDP theorems (the QDP definitions are only approximately dual) by converting defaults to likelihoods and vice versa. Versions of some QDP theorems and their (rearranged) duals are given in Table 1 . These duality properties come about because of the ba sic properties of negation and by the dual definitions for the operators. A more remarkable but not so exact duality can be seen in the consistency and consequence theorems for default and likelihood. Compare the al gorithms for the maximum and minimum inconsistent sets, and compare each of the results in Theorems 2 and 3. These theorems are not duals according to the definition of default and likelihood. For instance, the dual results to Theorem 2 would show a disjunction of likelihoods can be a consequence of a single like lihood rather than show a single likelihood can be a consequence of a conjunction of likelihoods, the situ ation of Theorem 3. The theorems are proven using quite different methods (for instance the results for likelihood are considerably harder to prove than those for default). Yet the theorems and algorithms have a remarkably similar form. Their major difference is that error combines slowly (linearly) for defaults but rapidly (multiplicatively) for likelihoods, though lin early in some special cases (Buntine, 1991b) . Because likelihood errors combine rapidly, people often keep track of the degree of likelihood. For instance, like lihoods are used to rank order hypotheses in model based diagnosis and abduction. Another result of this difference is that while considerable research has fo cussed on default reasoning, none to date has consid ered variable strength defaults as for instance allowed using error propagation functions and Theorem 2. In contrast, likelihood reasoning systems suggested in the literature introduced qualitative variable strength like lihoods from the beginning (Halpern and Rabin, 1987) .
UNIFYING COMPLEMENTARY REASONING FORMS
The treatment of the two paradoxes "Can joe read and write?" and the Yale shooting problem are an example of how independence becomes an important complementary reasoning form for conditional logics. Both these problems yield no paradox in Q D P, N P (Delgrande, 1988) and related conditional logics be cause no default conclusions can be made at all. This holds because the antecedents of a conditional default or likelihood rule cannot be arbitrarily specialised with some additional knowledge. That is, the QDp sen tence (B Given that we need complementary reasoning forms, how do we unify them? It would be nice if we could somehow keep the different reasoning styles in sepa rate modules, as suggested in hybrid reasoning sys tems (Frisch and Cohn, 1991) . However, experience gained in the exercise here indicates this may not usu ally be possible. The unifying of necessity and possi bility reasoning with default reasoning and likelihood reasoning, as presented in Theorems 2 and 3, required careful integration of the several approaches. Another unification that needs to be made is to integrate sym bolic reasoning about independence (Lauritzen et a!., 1990; Pearl, 1988) into the algorithms presented in Theorems 2 and 3.
APPROXIMATE REASONING
Qualitative reasoning about default and likelihood is interpreted here as an approximate form of reason ing that is bound to sometimes produce incorrect re sults. By investigating the quantitative counterpart to these reasoning forms, we are able to see more closely how this error propagates and accumulates and how we might track it, and we are able to better under stand the assumptions under which the system oper ates. A qualitative system, for instance, has an im plicit assumption that all errors € are identical. With the quantitative system, however, we are able to allow the errors to vary-a more realistic situation.
Of course, all these rough approximations could be circumvented if we would adhere to more complete, fully normative Bayesian reasoning in the first place. This raises the important question: When do approx imate systems such as DP buy us improved perfor mance in an application over more complete proba bilistic approaches? Comparative studies here do not exist. Approximate systems such as DP could be ap propriate for generating a comprehensible explanation of probabilistic results obtained, for instance, by other numeric methods. Also, approximate systems due to their more simplistic framework, may be more appro priate for rapid turn-around in system development and user training. They may therefore serve as a use ful complement to a more complete probabilistic ap proach rather than as a replacement. Only application experience will tell.
